This week the BBC reported that China is going to invest $250bn in Latin America in the next decade. The article, which you will find further below, raises important questions regarding the impacts of Chinese investment on the human rights landscape of the region. As has been widely reported (so I will not elaborate here), while Chinese investment can generate jobs and infrastructure in host countries, it can also result in forced “re-location of local communities, environmental pollution, and abuse of workers.”
To address these risks, the Business & Human Rights Resource Centre (BHRRC) launched an information hub with the following aims:
“1. Raise awareness of the social and environmental standards and guidelines that are in place for Chinese companies overseas.”
2. Increase transparency by disseminating news gathered by a network of regional researchers around the world: including examples of advances and positive steps by companies, allegations of misconduct, and policy developments.
3. Strengthen accountability, by inviting Chinese companies to respond when civil society raises specific concerns about their conduct overseas. The information hub features over 60 such approaches to date, with a 50% response rate.”
Latin American governments and civil society concerned with ensuring Chinese investment (like all investment) respects human rights should take note and make use of this platform.
For more on Chinese investment in Latin America, read this BBC piece by Katy Watson.
As I write, a Chinese billionaire is building a new canal in Nicaragua; China is buying up Brazilian soybean fields as well as planning to build a transcontinental railway that will transport all these raw materials to Peru’s Pacific Coast and on to China.
The Asian giant’s influence here is growing fast – it has pledged to invest $250bn (£161bn) in Latin America in the next decade. But what will this money do for Latin America?
Land of plenty
The Inter-American Development Bank says Latin America is the next global bread basket. With a third of the world’s fresh water resources and more than a quarter of its good quality farmland, this region has everything China needs.
China’s growth in the past decade and its insatiable appetite for commodities has seen resource-rich countries like Brazil prosper.
Latin America’s largest economy is now the world’s biggest exporter of foodstuffs like sugar cane, orange juice and soybean. Much of it is destined for Asia.
It sounds good but superlatives can be deceiving.
“Away from raw materials, Latin America doesn’t know what to export to China,” says Enrique Dussel Peters who heads the China-Mexico Studies Centre at Mexico’s National Autonomous University.
“There’s no strategic relationship, no programme in the short, medium or long term to overcome these problems.”
While China buys commodities, it exports manufacturing and lots of it. In 2000, bilateral trade between China and Latin America was worth $12bn. In 2013, that figure had risen to $289bn.
“The imbalanced South American commodity-for-manufactures relationship with China has long caused some in the region to worry about a repeat of historical raw material ‘dependency’ relations,” says Matt Ferchen who is a resident scholar at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy.
While that leaves commodity-rich countries vulnerable when China’s growth slows, countries further north have a slightly different relationship.
“In Mexico, the anxiety has been more focused on the trade imbalance and the challenge posed by China’s manufacturing and export prowess to the American market,” says Mr Ferchen.
In 2014, for every product Mexico exported to China, it imported 11 times that from the Asian giant.
“China has not only been a competitor, but an outright winner,” says Prof Adrian Hearn, from the University of Melbourne. “China is able to out-price and outcompete Mexican businesses in just about every sector.”
In late May, Li Keqiang, the Chinese prime minister, visited Brazil and announced $50bn of investments. Here in Mexico since 2013, promises have been made to invest in Mexico too. But the results have not been fruitful.
“There was political commitment by both presidents,” says Mr Peters.
“But what happens is that the civil servants below them haven’t known how to implement the strategies and policies of their respective presidents.”
In November 2014, President Enrique Pena Nieto cancelled a high-speed rail project shortly after it was awarded because of controversy in the bidding process. It was just a few days short of a state visit to China.
“That really hurt things,” says Margaret Myers, the director of the China and Latin America Programme at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington.
“There was a real momentum and that then kind of put the brakes on.”
There is still a great deal of caution over investments from Chinese companies.
“There’s no doubt that China is held under a magnifying glass when operating in Latin America,” says Ms Myers.
Despite significant Chinese immigrant communities in countries including Mexico, Cuba and Peru, culturally and geographically, China and Latin America have shown themselves to be worlds apart.
“The cultural divide seems deep with both simplistic and unhelpful stereotypes dominating on both sides,” says Matt Ferchen. “In Latin America, as elsewhere, Chinese officials want badly for China’s soft power to help leverage China’s commercial and diplomatic ties to the region, but so far such efforts seem to have had a minimal effect or to have been completely offset by local stereotypes or outright bias.”
In a region where US influence has often been resented politically, although welcomed economically, the future could look very different with more Chinese investment.
“Until now, both Chinese and American officials deny that they are competing for influence in Latin America,” says Antonio C Hsiang who is the director of the Centre for Latin American Economy and Trade Studies at Chihlee Institute of Technology in Taiwan.
“But that is what it looks like. Let us wait and see how much deeper China can dive into Latin America.”